




ENERO DE 2010 2
It’s Not My Money:An Experiment on Risk












Serie Documentos Cede, 2010-2 
Enero de 2010 
 
© 2010, Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–Cede 
Calle 19A No. 1 – 37, Bloque W. 
Bogotá, D. C., Colombia 





Carrera 1ª Este No. 19 – 27, edificio Aulas 6, A. A. 4976 
Bogotá, D. C., Colombia 




Edición, diseño de cubierta, preprensa y prensa digital: 
Proceditor ltda. 
Calle 1C No. 27 A – 01 
Bogotá, D. C., Colombia 




Impreso en Colombia – Printed in Colombia 
 
El contenido de la presente publicación se encuentra protegido por las normas internacionales y nacionales 
vigentes sobre propiedad intelectual, por tanto su utilización, reproducción, comunicación pública, trans-
formación, distribución, alquiler, préstamo público e importación, total o parcial, en todo o en parte, en formato 
impreso, digital o en cualquier formato conocido o por conocer, se encuentran prohibidos, y sólo serán lícitos en 
la medida en que se cuente con la autorización previa y expresa por escrito del autor o titular. Las limitaciones y 
excepciones al Derecho de Autor, sólo serán aplicables en la medida en que se den dentro de los denominados 
Usos Honrados (Fair use), estén previa y expresamente establecidas; no causen un grave e injustificado perjuicio a 
los intereses legítimos del autor o titular, y no atenten contra la normal explotación de la obra. 
   




IT’S NOT MY MONEY: AN EXPERIMENT ON RISK AVERSION AND THE 
HOUSE-MONEY EFFECT 
 
Luis Roberto Martínez 
Christian Jaramillo 
Nicolas de Roux 
Juan Camilo Cárdenas 
 
Abstract 
The house-money effect –people’s tendency to be more daring with easily-gotten money– is a 
behavioral pattern that poses questions about the external validity of experiments in economics: 
to what extent do people behave in experiments like they would have in a real-life situation, given 
that they play with easily-gotten house money? We ran an economic experiment with 66 students 
to measure the house-money effect on their risk preferences. They received an amount of money 
with which they made risky decisions involving losses and gains; a treatment group got the money 
21 days in advance and a control group got it the day of the experiment. We find that, when facing 
possible losses, people in the treatment group showed a lower tolerance to risk than people in the 
control group. If the players are assumed to have a CRRA utility function and to behave according 
to expected-utility theory, the risk-attitude adjustment corresponds to an average increase of 1 in 
their risk aversion coefficient. While the exact pattern of this house-money adjustment differs by 
gender, it is not possible to determine the sign of this gender effect unambiguously. In any case, it 
is advisable to include credible controls for the house-money effect in experimental work in 
economics.  
Key words: House-money effect, risk aversion, prospect theory, economic experiment, external 
validity. 





























ESTE NO ES MI DINERO: UN EXPERIMENTO SOBRE AVERSIÓN AL RIESGO 
Y EL EFECTO DE ‘DINERO DE LA CASA’ 
 
Luis Roberto Martínez 
Christian Jaramillo 
Nicolás de Roux 
Juan Camilo Cárdenas 
 
Resumen 
El efecto de ‘dinero de la casa’ es la tendencia de las personas a ser más osadas con dinero 
obtenido sin dificultad. Este patrón de conducta genera interrogantes sobre la validez externa de 
los experimentos económicos, dado que los participantes en experimentos suelen recibir dinero 
suficiente para cubrir cualquier pérdida: ¿Hasta qué punto se comportan las personas igual en el 
experimento y en la vida real? Nosotros realizamos un experimento con 66 estudiantes para medir 
el efecto de ‘dinero de la casa’ en sus preferencias sobre riesgo. Los participantes recibieron una 
suma de dinero con la que tomaron decisiones riesgosas que incluían posibles pérdidas y 
ganancias. El grupo de tratamiento recibió el dinero 21 días antes de la sesión experimental 
mientras que el grupo de control recibió el dinero ese mismo día. Encontramos que en el 
escenario con posibilidad de pérdidas el grupo de tratamiento mostró menor tolerancia hacia el 
riesgo que el grupo de control. Si suponemos que los participantes tienen una función de utilidad 
CRRA y que se comportan acorde a la teoría de la utilidad esperada, el ajuste en el coeficiente de 
aversión al riesgo por efecto de ‘dinero de la casa’ tiene una magnitud promedio de 1. También 
encontramos que el efecto de ‘dinero de la casa’ no parece afectar por igual a hombres y mujeres, 
aunque es difícil establecer de manera precisa el sentido de esta heterogeneidad. En todo caso, es 
recomendable incluir controles para el efecto de ‘dinero de la casa’ en el trabajo experimental en 
economía.  
Palabras clave: efecto de dinero de la casa, aversión al riesgo, teoría de perspectivas, 
experimento. 








The house-money effect –people’s tendency to be more daring with easily-gotten money– is a 
behavioral pattern (Thaler and Johnson, 1990) that finds theoretical support in Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Since experiments in economics usually start by handing out 
money to the subjects so that they never stand to suffer any net monetary losses, the 
participants' behavior could be modified as a result of the house-money effect. This poses 
questions about the external validity of experiments in economics: to what extent do people 
behave in the experiment like they would have in a real-life situation, given that they play with 
easily-gotten house money? (Guala, 2005; Levitt and List, 2006) 
The experimental literature has addressed this question in the context of public goods (Clark, 
2002), auctions (Ackert et al., 2006) and capital expenditure (Keasey and Moon, 1996). The general 
idea of windfall gains has been also explored in the psychology and economics literatures (Arkes et 
al., 1994; Keeler et al., 1985). 
This paper studies the effect of house money on the risk preferences of a group of 66 
undergraduate students within an age range of 16 to 28. The students were randomly assigned to 
a control or a treatment group and given money to participate in the experiment, which they were 
told involved risky choices and possibly losses. As usual, the money handed out for participating 
was enough to cover the potential losses. However, while the control group received this initial 
money just before they made their choices, the treatment group received the money three weeks 
in advance so that they had time to spend it before making their choices (And so they did.) This 
experimental design, inspired in Bosch-Domenech and Silvestre (2006), is as close as we can get to 
having them gamble with their own money. 
We find clear evidence that people increase their risk aversion when playing with their own money 
(the treatment group) in a game with losses. If the players are assumed to have a CRRA utility 
function, the adjustment corresponds to a revealed average increase of around 1 in their risk 
aversion coefficient.  
Such a strong effect does indeed question the external validity of experimental studies of or 
involving risk. Empirical evidence from survey work from a developing country suggests risk 
aversion coefficients between 0 and 5 (Azam et al., 2002). It is therefore advisable to include 







Our subjects were students of an undergraduate psychology course at the Universidad de los 
Andes in Bogotá (Colombia). The students in the class were randomly assigned to a treatment or 
control group and then asked to consent to participate in an economic experiment that involved 
risky choices. 66 of them accepted, 32 in the treatment and 34 in the control group. Students in 
both groups belonged to more than 12 different majors and no more than 20% of the participants 
in any of the groups belonged to any particular major. Table 1 shows the average characteristics of 
each group.  
 
Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Treatment and Control Groups 
Variable 
Mean value or percentage  P-value 
Control  Treatment  Rank sum test  T-test 
Gender (%female)  41% 50%  0.475  0.480 
Age  20.0 18.8  0.103  0.036 
Single*  97% 100%  0.332 0.336 
Siblings  1.55 1.47  0.608  0.685 
Semester  3.15 2.72  0.279  0.394 
Risk 
attitude at new 
restaurant 
Asks waiter  18% 13% 
0.540 0.712  Known dish  18% 33% 
Tries new  65% 53% 
 Monthly expenses** (COP)  422000  414000  0.755  0.880 
Housing stratum  4.82 4.63  0.317  0.445 
Money in pocket (COP)  47386 70754  0.000  0.047 
Money in pocket *** (COP)  87386  70754  0.096  0.154 
*only one participant (control group) reported "other" as marital status. 
**using midpoint of reported range. 
***amount of money at time of making decisions (pocket + $40,000 for participants in control group) 
 
Treatment subjects were then given COP 40000 in small change (roughly USD 20 given an 
exchange rate of COP 1971 on the day of the experiment. The minimum monthly wage in 
Colombia is COP 497000). Three weeks later, again in class, the decision-making session took 
place. One half of the treatments reported to have spent all of their endowment and only 28% 
claimed to have kept it all. The control group was given their respective COP 40000 and everybody 
proceeded then to make their choices. 
All participants were handed a piece of paper with six different uniform-probability lotteries 
involving possible losses (left panel, Figure 2) depending on a coin toss. They were then asked to 5 
 
choose one lottery to play. At that point they didn’t know they would have further choices to 
make.  
After collecting their choices, they were handed a second set of six lotteries (right panel, Figure 2). 
None of these involved losses and they were told that the outcome would depend on another coin 
toss and that their payments would be computed using the sum of results of both lotteries. After 
collecting their new choices, they were asked to fill out a brief socioeconomic survey. Only then 
did both coin tosses take place. (The first one went their way; the second didn´t.) 
Figure 2: Games and Payoffs 
Game 1                                                                  Game 2 
 
In each game, both risk and expected return increase clockwise from the top. However, lotteries E 
and F have the same expected return. 
Payoffs in thousands of Colombian Pesos (COP) (Exchange rate: COP 1971).  
 
Results 
Table 3 shows the means of choices in each game for treatments and controls. GAME1 and 
GAME2 indicate the choice in each game. In both games, lotteries A through F of Figure 2 are 
coded 1 through 6: GAME1 = 1 means the subject chose lottery A in game 1, and a larger value 
indicates the choice of a riskier lottery. On average, the difference in mean choice between 
treatments and controls was not significant in GAME2 (no losses), but treatments chose less risky 
lotteries in GAME1 (possible losses). The result is not due to cash constraints since MONEY IN 
POCKET*** is similar for both groups. In fact, the differences between the treatment and control 
groups would appear to be driven by the behavior of males. The full distribution of choices is 



























Table 3: Experimental Results by Treatment and Gender 
Variable 
All Male  Female 
Treatment Control  P-Value Treatment Control P-Value Treatment  Control P-Value 
GAME1  3.50  4.21  0.043 3.19  4.65  0.004 3.81  3.57  0.617 
GAME2  3.50  3.35  0.968 3.06  3.45  0.483 3.94  3.21  0.465 
P-Values for difference in means Rank Sum test 
 
Additionally, we calculate ΔGAME ￿ GAME1–GAME2; the choice displacement between games.  
A positive value of ΔGAME means the subject chose a riskier lottery in game 1. On average, the 
subjects chose riskier lotteries when losses were possible, consistent with Cardenas and Carpenter 
(2009). Panel (e) in Figure 4 shows the full distribution of ΔGAME for treatments and controls: the 
treatments are more to the left, suggesting higher levels of risk aversion. We show later that 
choosing different lotteries in each game may be consistent with a stable attitude towards risk, 
however. 
 






































































































(c) Games 1 & 2: Control

































(d) Games 1 & 2: Treatment
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(e) Change from GAME 2 to GAME 1: Control & Treatment
CONTROL TREATMENT
Treatment and Control Groups
Decisions in Game 1 and Game 27 
 
Next we estimate parametric and non-parametric individual-level regressions, using the survey 
data as explanatory variables. Following standard practice, we take the game unambiguously 
without losses (GAME2) to be the benchmark –the intrinsic risk attitude of the player. The ordered 
logit (Ologit) regression (1) in Table 5 deals with the determinants of that intrinsic risk attitude. 
The dependent variable is GAME2; no explanatory variable has a clear effect on the risk attitude of 
the players.  
 
Table 5: Regression results 
  
Dependent Variable 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
   GAME2 GAME1  γ (GAME1)  Δγ (Sign) 
  
Treatment  -0.484 -2.051***  0.999**  2.827** 
   [0.614] [0.672]  [0.384]  [1.103] 
GAME2  0.301* 1.415*** 
   [0.155] [0.303] 
 γ (GAME2)  0.230**    
   [0.099]    
Gender  -0.289 -1.229*  0.784**  1.524 
   [0.612] [0.651]  [0.332]  [1.097] 
Gender*Treatment  1.105 2.115**  -1.167  -1.433 
   [0.905] [0.967]  [0.575]  [1.418] 
Expenses  0.168 -0.289** 0.180***  0.182 
   [0.118] [0.120]  [0.054]  [0.169] 
Stratum  0.0243 0.423*  -0.278*  0.309 
   [0.227] [0.240]  [0.141]  [0.344] 
Constant  -0.267    
   [0.682]    
     
Observations  66 66  66  66 
R-squared  0.02 0.10  0.34  0.47 
Method  OLogit OLogit  OLS  OLogit 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at  1%. 
 
Column (2) in Table 5 is also an Ologit; the categorical dependent variable is GAME1. Table 6 
reports the marginal effects associated with this regression, the coefficients on TREATMENT 
indicate the change in the probability of choosing the corresponding lottery. Other things equal, 8 
 
belonging to the treatment group is associated with a higher probability of playing lotteries B and 
C and with a lower probability of playing lotteries D and F. Again, the treatments chose less risky 
lotteries. However, for women the evidence is mixed: women in the treatment group have a 0.07 
higher probability of playing lottery B but also a 0.1 higher probability of choosing F.  
 
Table 6: Marginal Effects, Regression 2 (Table 5) 
  
Marginal Effects on Outcomes Probabilities. Dependent 
Variable: GAME 1 
   Outcome 
   A B C  D  E  F 
           
Treatment  0.023  0.220** 0.213*** -0.116* -0.0559 -0.285*** 
   [0.0240]  [0.0895]  [0.0717]  [0.0699]  [0.0343]  [0.0996] 
Gender  0.0128 0.131* 0.143*  -0.0853 -0.0369 -0.165* 
   [0.0149]  [0.0789]  [0.0738]  [0.0619]  [0.0275]  [0.0891] 
Gender*Treatment  -0.0137 -0.153** -0.235**  -0.0349 0.0468  0.390* 
   [0.0143]  [0.0649]  [0.0924]  [0.0955]  [0.0297]  [0.204] 
 
 
Returning to Table 5, columns (3) and (4) carry out a parametric analysis. Each subject is assumed 






γ is then the risk aversion parameter. Following Binswanger (1980) and Barr and Genicot (2008), 
we then ask what range of γ is consistent with each choice of lottery in each game. To do this, we 
take into account that the subjects choose their first lottery thinking this choice is the only source 
of uncertainty, but when they get to the second lottery they are aware that they are already facing 
uncertainty due to the previous lottery (i.e. they face four possible states of the world). Thus they 
presumably choose the second lottery to hedge their overall risk. For their choices to be consistent 
there must exist some value of γ that fits with both of them.  
For each lottery choice in each one of the games we calculate then a range of compatible γ and 
assign it to those subjects who chose that lottery –each player has two assigned ranges, one for 9 
 
each game.
1 In the OLS regression in column (3) of Table 5, we imputed to each player in each 
game the mean value of the range. The γ implied by GAME1 is the dependent variable. The results 
show that the treatment increases γ by roughly 1 on average.  
One could worry however that the OLS relies on an imputed point value of γ. In the ordered logit 
regression in column (4) of Table 5 we use as dependent variable Δγ(Sign): the sign of the change 
in risk aversion from game 2 to game 1. Δγ(Sign) may be one, zero or minus one, zero meaning 
that the choices in both games were consistent with some value of γ. Figure 7 shows the 
distribution of Δγ(Sign) for the treatment and control groups. Panel (c) shows a general tendency 
for people to become less risk averse when faced with losses, as expected from Prospect Theory. It 
also shows that this tendency was larger for the control group, suggesting again the presence of 
the house-money effect. However, panels (a) and (b) contradict our previous reading of the effect 
of gender insofar as women appear to exhibit the house-money effect more than men. 
 
Figure 7: Sign of Change in ￿ from Game 2 to Game 1 
 
 
                                                           


































































































Decreases(-1) No change(0) Increases(1)
(c) All
CONTROL TREATMENT
(1)  GAME1|GAME2 combinations: AC, AD, AE, AF, BF*, CF*, DF*.
(0)  GAME1|GAME2 combinations: AA*, AB, BB*, BC, BD*, BE, CE, DE, EE, EF, FE, FF*.
(-1) GAME1|GAME2 combinations: BA, CA*, CB*, CC*, CD, DA*, DB*, DC*, DD*, EA, EB, EC*, ED, FA*, FB*, FC, FD.
* indicates actually chosen combinations
Change in Risk Aversion Parameter (Gamma)
from Game 2 to Game 110 
 
Table 8 shows marginal effects for regression (4) of Table 5. People in the treatment group are 
0.57 less likely to become more risk loving when moving from the game without losses to the 
game with losses. The gender controls have no statistical significance. 
 
Table 8: Marginal Effects, Regression 4 (Table 5) 
  
Marginal Effects on Outcomes 
Probabilities. Dependent 
Variable: Δ γ (Sign) 
   Outcome 
   -1 0  1 
Treatment  -0.567*** 0.525*** 0.0426 
   [0.174]  [0.169]  [0.0345] 
Gender  -0.333 0.313  0.0193 
   [0.223]  [0.212]  [0.0199] 
Gender*Treatment 0.268 -0.256  -0.0117





We ran an economic experiment with 66 students to measure the house-money effect on their 
risk preferences. They received an amount of money with which they made risky decisions 
involving losses and gains; a treatment group got the money 21 days in advance and a control 
group got it the day of the experiment. The money the treatments had in their wallets confirmed 
that they had in fact spent part of the endowment –thus we believe that the money was 
incorporated as part of their disposable income.  
Our results agree with the literature in finding that, on average, women are more risk averse than 
men and people are less risk averse when the game involves possible losses. However, when 
facing possible losses, people in the treatment group showed a lower tolerance to risk than people 
in the control group. If the players are assumed to have a CRRA utility function and to behave 
according to expected-utility theory, the risk-attitude adjustment corresponds to an average 
increase of 1 in their risk aversion coefficient. Finally, while the exact pattern of this house-money 
adjustment differs by gender, it is not possible to determine the sign of this gender effect 
unambiguously.   11 
 
Our results contribute to the existing literature in various domains. Experiments that involve 
studying strategic behavior with possible losses should take into account that when subjects 
receive an endowment they might not treat it as part of their real income. Secondly, there is a 
cross interaction of gender and house-money effects that suggests that individual characteristics 
may influence the way in which easily-gotten money affects behavior. This should be taken into 
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